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Abstract
We consider a dynamic version of sender-receiver games, where the sequence of states
follows a Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild assumptions, we characterize
the limit set of equilibrium payoffs. We obtain a strong dichotomy property: either only
uninformative “babbling” equilibria exist, or we can slightly perturb the game so that
all equilibrium payoffs can be achieved with strategies where, in most of the stages, the
sender reveals the true state to the receiver.
1 Introduction
Since Crawford and Sobel (1982), sender-receiver games, or cheap-talk games, have become a
natural framework for studying issues of information transmission between a privately informed
‘expert’ and an uninformed decision maker, where the two parties have conflicting interests.
When the decision maker acts only once, the extent to which information can be shared at
equilibrium has been studied extensively, when ‘talk’ takes place prior to the decision stage.
While Crawford and Sobel (1982), see also Green and Stokey (2007), have focused on the
case where communication is limited to a single costless and non-verifiable message from the
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sender to the receiver, more recent papers have shown that this restriction is not innocuous,
and have characterized the equilibrium outcomes for general cheap-talk games, see Krishna
and Morgan (2001), Aumann and Hart (2003).1 This work has been motivated by numerous
concrete situations. We refer to Krishna and Morgan (2008), Farrell and Rabin (1996), and
Sobel (2009) for a discussion of these applications.
The present work is motivated by the following observation. When the sender is a financial
advisor who provides advice to a client, an expert who is consulted on a project, or a referee on
a project/person, the situation often calls for a dynamic approach. Indeed, the financial advisor
provides advice on a series of investments, and the expert and the referee may be consulted on
successive, related projects.
Golosov, Skreta, Tsyvinsky and Wilson (2009) consider such a situation. They assume that
the sender repeatedly sends messages, the receiver repeatedly makes decisions, while the state
of the world remains fixed throughout. Within the Crawford and Sobel framework (continuum
of states/messages), they show that (necessarily complex) equilibria exist, that achieve full
revelation of the state of the world in finite time.
We here deal with situations in which the state of the world may change through time.
Specifically, we assume that the successive states form an irreducible Markov chain over some
finite set. In every stage, the sender issues a message/recommendation, and the receiver makes
a decision. States are only known to the sender, and payoffs only depend on the current state
and on the receiver’s decision, but not on the message sent by the sender.
Since states are autocorrelated, any information disclosed in stage n provides valuable in-
formation in later stages as well, as in Golosov et al. (2009). Yet, since the Markov Chain is
irreducible, this information becomes eventually valueless.
Intuitively, the inter-temporal situation puts some restrictions on the players’ behavior. As
an illustration, the opinion of an expert who systematically provides laudative reports will
eventually come to be discounted, if not ignored, since the decision maker is aware of the
fact that the time-average report of the quality of people/projects should reflect the invariant
measure of the states of the world. On the other hand, an expert who genuinely provides
accurate information to promote efficiency, but sees that the decision maker only acts in his
interests, may become wary and may stop to provide valuable information to the decision maker.
As is well-known from repeated games, the sender may indeed provide powerful incentives by
1The case of verifiable messages has also been studied in detail, see Forges and Koessler (2008).
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conditioning his future communication policy on the behavior of the decision maker.
Our paper belongs to the recent and growing literature on incomplete information games,
in which the uncertainty evolves, see, e.g., Athey and Bagwell (2008), Mailath and Samuelson
(2001), Phelan (2006), Renault (2006), Wiseman (2008), and Ho¨rner et al. (2010). Our objec-
tive is to study how the various effects of the dynamic environment combine to determine the set
of equilibrium payoffs. We provide a characterization of the limit set of sequential equilibrium
payoffs, when players become more and more patient.
Our main findings are the following. First, the limit set of equilibrium payoffs, as the players
become more and more patient, does not depend on how successive states are correlated, nor on
fine details of the sequence of states, but only on the invariant measure. In particular, the set
of equilibrium payoffs can be computed as if successive states were independent. This result
holds as soon as we assume that the Markov chains has exogeneous shocks, see Assumption
A below, an assumption that is satisfied in all the models quoted above.
Second, all equilibrium payoffs can be implemented by equilibria in which with high probabil-
ity, most of the time the sender truthfully reports the current state, while the receiver responds
in a stationary manner to the announcements of the sender, and checks that the distribution of
these announcements is consistent with the invariant measure. More precisely, a feasible payoff
vector is an equilibrium payoff provided two conditions are met. On the one hand, the payoff
of the receiver should be at least his babbling equilibrium payoff, since the receiver has the
option to ignore the announcements of the sender. On the other hand, the sender may always
choose to report fictitious states, as long as his reports cannot statistically be proven to be
non-truthful. This leads to an incentive constraint, according to which truth-telling should be
optimal, given the policy of the receiver. As it turns out, this incentive constraint takes the
form of finitely many linear inequalities,2 and therefore can be easily verified. In particular, the
equilibrium payoffs of the receiver cannot be lower in the dynamic game than in the one-shot
game. Surprisingly, this conclusion is not valid for the sender, as we show by means of an
example.
This second property (almost complete revelation of information at equilibria) is valid for a
large class of games, but not for all of them. More precisely, we prove that under Assumption
A, either only completely uninformative (or babbling) equilibria exist (for the game itself as
well as for all small perturbations of the game), or we can slightly perturb the payoffs so as to
2These inequalities moreover do not involve the transition function of the Markov chain.
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ensure that the second property holds.
The paper is structured as follows. The model is described in Section 2. In Section 3 we
provide an example that shows the intuition underlying the results and the proofs. The main
results and several comments appear in Section 4. Section 5 contains some proofs, and the
Appendix contains the more technical ones.
2 Model
We study dynamic sender-receiver games, in which the state of the world changes through
time. At each stage n ≥ 1, the sender (player 1) observes the current state of the world sn ∈ S,
and chooses a message tn ∈ T . Upon observing tn, the receiver (player 2) chooses an action
bn ∈ B. The current action bn, together with the current state sn, determines the utility vector
u(sn,bn) = (u
1(sn,bn), u
2(sn,bn)) ∈ R2 at stage n, where the first coordinate is the sender’s
utility, and the second coordinate is the receiver’s utility. Only the action bn is then publicly
disclosed. As in most of the literature on repeated games with incomplete information, we
thus maintain the assumption that payoffs are not observed.3 The two players share a common
discount factor δ.
We assume throughout that the set of states S, the set of messages T , and the set of actions
B, are finite. We also assume that the set of messages T coincides with the set of states S. The
assumption that there are at least as many messages as states ensures that the only motives
for concealing the state are strategic. We thus put aside situations in which, due to capacity
constraints, the sender might be forced to choose which feature of the state to reveal. To derive
our results, we will not need to assume that there are more messages than states. W.l.o.g., all
payoffs are in [0, 1].
We assume that the states sn follow a Markov chain over S, with transition function p(· | ·),
which is irreducible and aperiodic.4 The Markov chain therefore admits a unique invariant
measure, m ∈ ∆(S). For convenience, we assume that the first state, s1, is drawn according
to m. This ensures that the law of sn is equal to m, for every n ≥ 1. W.l.o.g., the invariant
measure m assigns positive probability to each state s ∈ S.
3In Golosov et al. (2009), this assumption is viewed as an idealization of a situation with random, observed,
payoffs. In such a situation, the receiver might perform some Bayesian updating based on the payoffs.
4That is, for any two states s, t ∈ S, and for every N ∈ N large enough, the probability of moving from s to
t in exactly N stages is positive.
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Our goal is to study to what extent the dynamic structure of the game affects the equilibrium
outcomes. Formally, we aim at providing a characterization of the limit set of sequential
equilibrium payoffs, and at understanding equilibrium behavior, when players become more
and more patient.5
For some of our results, we will make one substantive assumption on the behavior of the
state.
Assumption A. There exist nonnegative numbers αs, s ∈ S, with
∑
s∈S\s¯
αs ≤ 1 (for every
s¯ ∈ S), such that p(s′ | s) = αs′ whenever s′ 6= s.
To motivate this assumption, consider the following story. Changes in the state are due
to extraneous shocks, which occur at random times. That is, once drawn, the state remains
constant until an exogenous shock occurs. When such a shock occurs, the state is drawn anew,
according to m. The inter-arrival times of the successive shocks are i.i.d., and follow a geometric
distribution. In that case, Assumption A is met. Indeed, it suffices to set αt = pi × m(t)
for every t ∈ S, where pi is the per-stage probability of a shock. The parameter pi is here a
measure of the state persistence. When pi increases from 0 to 1, the situation evolves from one
in which the state remains constant through time, to a situation in which successive states are
independent.
When pi = 1, the successive states are independent, and identically distributed according to
m. Thus, Assumption A holds in the case of i.i.d. states.
Note that Assumption A also holds in the benchmark case where there are only two
possible states.6 Indeed, denoting the two states by s1 and s2, it suffices to set α1 = p(s1 | s2)
and α2 = p(s2 | s1).
As a further simple illustration, consider a symmetric random walk on three states. That is,
whenever in a state, the chain moves to each of the two other states with probability 1
2
. Again,
Assumption A is met, with αs =
1
2
for each s ∈ S.
Albeit restrictive (as we will see later), Assumption A allows for a variety of Markov
5Sequential equilibria are defined only for finite games, but the concept has a natural extension to our setup,
see Section 5.1.2.
6This case need not fit into the first case, as shown by the Markov chain with two states where the probability
of moving from s to s′ is 2/3 whenever s 6= s′.
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chains, and it is met in many existing papers, including Athey and Bagwell (2008), Phelan
(2006).
For most of the paper, a strategy of the sender maps past and current realized states, and
past play, into a mixed message, and is thus a function σ : ∪n≥0(S × T × B)n × S → ∆(T ),
while a strategy of the receiver is a function τ : ∪n≥0(T ×B)n → ∆(B). A stationary strategy
of the receiver is a map y : T → ∆(B), with the interpretation that the receiver chooses his
action according to y(· | t) ∈ ∆(B) whenever told t ∈ T .
3 An Example
We here illustrate the main results using a simple example. There are two states, S = {L,R},
and two actions for the receiver, l and r. Successive states are independent and equally likely.
Payoffs are given by the two tables in Figure 1, where c is a fixed parameter, with c ∈ (1, 2).
l r
c, 2 2, 1
State L
l r
1,−1 2, 1
State R
Figure 1: The payoffs of the two players.
The one-shot information transmission game has a unique equilibrium, in which the receiver
plays r with probability 1. To see this, assume by way of contradiction that there is a message
t¯ that is sent with positive probability (in some state) and following which the receiver plays
l with positive probability. By sequential rationality, the belief held by the receiver following
t¯ must assign a probability of at least 2
3
to the state being L. Since both states are ex ante
equally likely, this implies that there is some message t˜, following which the receiver assigns
probability higher than 1
2
to the state being R. By sequential rationality, the receiver plays r
following t˜. As a consequence, in both states, the expected payoff of the sender is equal to 2
when sending t˜, and is less than 2 when sending the message t¯. Therefore, it cannot be that t¯
is sent with positive probability – a contradiction.
All equilibria in the one-shot game are therefore babbling equilibria.7 Plainly, the dynamic
game admits a babbling equilibrium, in which the receiver believes the announcements of the
7In the sense that the action of the receiver is independent of the message sent by the sender.
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sender to be uninformative, and plays r in every stage (and the sender always sends the same
message). In addition, the receiver can always choose to ignore the announcements of the
sender, and to play r in every stage, thereby getting 1. As a result, the babbling equilibrium is
the worst equilibrium for the receiver, in both the one-shot and in the dynamic game.
We claim that the dynamic game has equilibrium payoffs that are arbitrarily close to (2+c
2
, 3
2
).
This has the surprising implication that the lowest equilibrium payoff of the sender may be lower
in the dynamic game than in the static game. Here is the intuition. The sender announces
the true state at every stage. The receiver listens to the announcements of the sender, and
plays l when told L, r when told R. This obviously raises the concern that the sender may
choose to announce R in every stage. To prevent this from happening, the receiver monitors
the announcements of the sender, and stops listening if there is an obvious bias (to either L
or R). Under the constraint that he should announce both states equally often, the expected
payoff of the sender is highest when he reports truthfully.
While this intuition is simple, formalizing it into an equilibrium of the discounted game is
not straightforward. Indeed, because payoffs are discounted, the sender may have a preference
to send at first the message R more frequently.
We start with a simple construction that yields an equilibrium payoff that differs from (2, 1).
Assume that the discount factor satisfies δ >
4− 2c
3− c .
• At odd stages, the sender announces truthfully the current stage, and the receiver plays
l if told L, and r if told R.
• At even stages, the sender announces a constant message, and the receiver plays the action
that he did not play in the previous stage.
• If the receiver deviates, both players switch to the babbling equilibrium forever.
We now verify that this construction is indeed an equilibrium. If the players follow this con-
struction, their expected payoffs are equal to
1
1 + δ
(
2 + c
2
+ δ
5 + c
4
)
and
1
1 + δ
(
3
2
+
3
4
δ
)
respectively. Because a deviation of the receiver is followed by the babbling equilibrium, which
yields 1 to the receiver, while the expected payoff of the receiver at every stage is at least 1,
no other strategy of the receiver yields a higher payoff. Regarding the sender, it is sufficient to
show that he cannot profit by deviating in any block of two stages. In such a block the sender
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has two possible deviations: to announce L in the first stage of the block when the true state
is R, and to announce R in the first stage of the block when the true state is L. In the former
case, he gets 1 at the first stage and 2 in the second (instead of 2 at the first stage and 1+c
2
at
the second stage if he announces truthfully). In the latter case, he gets 2 at the first stage and
1+c
2
at the second stage (instead of c at the first stage and 2 at the second stage if he announces
truthfully). The choice of δ ensures that none of these deviations is profitable.
To get payoffs closer to (2+c
2
, 3
2
), we will be relying on a slightly more complex construction.
We let the size 2N of a block be large enough, so that a law of large numbers will apply. Once N
is fixed, we let the discount factor δ be high enough, so that the contribution of any individual
block to the overall discounted payoff is very small.
We first describe a pure strategy τ of the receiver. In each block (unless if the receiver
has deviated earlier, see below), the receiver listens to the sender’s announcements, plays l if
told L, r if told R, until the number of announcements of either L or R exceeds N . When
this happens, the receiver stops listening to the sender’s announcements, and plays the least
frequent action until the end of the current block.8 If indeed the sender reports truthfully the
current state, with high probability, the receiver will stop listening to the sender only ‘shortly’
before the end of the block, and the expected payoff is therefore close to (2+c
2
, 3
2
).
In contrast with the situation examined above, it need not be optimal for the sender to
report truthfully when facing τ . However, a crucial insight is that any best reply of the sender
to τ must be reporting truthfully most of the time, with high probability. To see why, observe
that any best reply achieves a payoff of at least, say, 2+c
2
− ε. But since the receiver plays both
actions l and r equally likely on each block, this implies that with high probability the action
of the receiver matches the state, most of the time.
We let σ be any pure best-reply of the sender to τ . On the equilibrium path, we let players
play according to σ and τ . By construction, the equilibrium property holds for the sender. To
deter the receiver from deviating, both players switch forever to the babbling equilibrium once
a deviation of the receiver is detected. Since blocks are short, the expected continuation payoff
of the receiver is close to 3
2
following any history, while the receiver gets a payoff of 1 (or close
to 1) if he deviates.
8An alternative construction, that we adopt in the general case, is for the receiver to generate a specific
sequence of fictitious announcements, and continue as if the sender’s announcements were equal to the fictitious
ones.
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This construction hinges on two simple properties. First, the receiver follows most of the
time a stationary strategy, y : S → ∆(B), and his action choices are monitored by the sender.
To ensure that the threat of switching to the babbling equilibrium provides the receiver with
the appropriate incentives, it is enough that the expected payoff of the receiver be higher than
v2, the babbling equilibrium payoff. Provided that the sender truthfully reports the state most
of the time, this individual rationality condition writes as∑
s∈S
m(s)u2(s, y(· | s)) ≥ v2.
Second, the receiver performs basic consistency checks on the successive announcements
of the sender. Here, the receiver simply makes sure that the different states are announced
according to their theoretical frequency (possibly by substituting actual announcements by
fictitious announcements). When facing the stationary strategy y : S → ∆(B), the expected
payoff of the sender is a function of the average joint distribution of the true state, and of the
sender’s announcement. Denoting by µ the average (expected) distribution of this pair (sn, tn),
the statistical checks by the receiver restrict the sender to distributions µ whose marginal on
S and on T are both equal to m. As soon as truth-telling maximizes the payoff of the sender
under this restriction, such checks are effective in preventing deviations by the sender. This
condition takes the following form:∑
s∈S
m(s)u1(s, y(· | s)) ≥
∑
s∈S,t∈T
µ(s, t)u1(s, y(· | t)),
for every distribution µ ∈ ∆(S × T ) whose marginals on both S and T are equal to m.
4 Results
4.1 Statement of the main results
We provide a characterization of the payoff vectors that can be approximated by sequential
equilibrium payoffs, when players are sufficiently patient. We start with some notations. Let
T be a copy of the set of states S. Elements of T are interpreted as fictitious states, and will
represent messages that the sender sends to the receiver.
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Building on the example, we denote byM⊂ ∆(S × T ) the set of copulas based on m; that
is, the set of distributions µ over S × T whose marginals on S and on T are both equal to m.
The set M is defined with a finite number of linear inequalities, hence it is a compact convex
polyhedron, so it has finitely many extreme points.
We denote by µ0 ∈ M the specific distribution defined as µ0(s, s) = m(s) for each s ∈ S,
and µ0(s, t) = 0 if s 6= t. Under µ0, the fictitious and the true states coincide a.s. Thus, the
distribution µ0 is the long-run average distribution of the sequence (sn, tn)n when the sender
reports truthfully.
Given a copula µ ∈M, and a stationary strategy y : S → ∆(B), we set
U(µ, y) :=
∑
s∈S,t∈T
µ(s, t)u(s, y(t)) ∈ R2.
This is the expected payoff vector when the sender’s report is chosen by µ(· | s), and the receiver
plays y. The babbling equilibrium payoff of the receiver is given by
v2 := max
b∈B
U2(µ0, b) = max
b∈B
∑
s∈S
m(s)u2(s, b). (1)
Note that v2 is also equal to the min max value of the receiver in the dynamic game.
We let E(M) denote the set of payoff vectors U(µ0, y), where y : S → ∆(B), that satisfy
C1. U1(µ0, y) ≥ U1(µ, y) for every µ ∈M.
C2. U2(µ0, y) ≥ v2.
Condition C2 is the individual rationality condition of the receiver: the receiver’s payoff is at
least his min-max value. Condition C1 reads as an incentive compatibility condition of the
sender. It may be interpreted as saying that truth-telling is optimal for the sender, when the
successive announcements of the sender are constrained to be statistically indistinguishable from
truth-telling. Note however that the version of ‘statistical indistinguishability’ that is implicit
in C2 is a very weak one. Indeed, it is only required that the frequencies of the different
announcements be equal to those of truth-telling, yet the frequency of patterns of states longer
than 1 under truth-telling may differ from those under µ.
For a given stationary strategy y, the map µ 7→ U1(µ, y) is linear. Hence, condition C1
holds as soon as the inequality in C1 holds for each of the finitely many extreme points ofM,
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one of which is µ0. Moreover, the set of y such that both C1 and C2 hold is a compact convex
polyhedron in ∆(B)S. It follows that the set E(M) is also a compact convex polyhedron.
We define Ê(M) as the set of payoff vectors U(µ0, y) ∈ E(M) where the inequalities in C1
and C2 are strict. That is, Ê(M) is the set of vectors U(µ0, y), y : S → ∆(B)), such that
D1. U1(µ0, y) > U
1(µ, y) for every µ ∈M, µ 6= µ0.
D2. U2(µ0, y) > v
2.
Note that condition D1 holds as soon as the inequality U1(µ0, y) > U
1(µ, y) is satisfied for
each of the finitely many extreme points µ 6= µ0 of M.
The set Ê(M) is an open subset of E(M), but it need not be equal to the relative interior
of E(M). When we want to emphasize the dependency of the set Ê(M) on the game G, we
write ÊG(M).
We denote by NEδ and SEδ the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs and of sequential equilibrium
payoffs respectively. Plainly, SEδ ⊆ NEδ for every δ. We will also sometimes assume the
existence of a public randomizing device, that sends a public message at every stage after the
announcement of the sender. We denote by NECδ and SECδ the set of Nash equilibrium
payoffs and of sequential equilibrium payoffs of the repeated game with the public randomizing
device. The set NECδ contains SECδ and NEδ and is the largest of the four equilibrium sets.
Our first main result, Theorem 1 below, assumes the existence of a public randomizing
device, that sends extraneous signals in every stage.
Theorem 1 Suppose that there exists a public randomizing device, which outputs a (uniformly
distributed) number in [0, 1] in every stage, after the announcement of the sender. If Ê(M) 6= ∅
then
E(M) ⊆ lim inf
δ→1
SECδ.
Theorem 1 means that for every γ ∈ E(M) and for every ε > 0 there is δ0 < 1 such that,
for every δ ≥ δ0, the δ-discounted game has a sequential equibrium payoff (in pure strategies)
within ε of γ. We will actually prove the stronger statement that δ0 can be chosen to be
independent of γ:
lim
δ→1
sup
γ∈E(M)
d(γ, SECδ) = 0.
Our second result is valid, whether or not there is such a public randomizing device, but it
requires Assumption A.
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Theorem 2 Suppose that Assumption A holds. Then, for every δ < 1, one has
NEδ ⊆ E(M).
Provided that Ê(M) 6= ∅ and that Assumption A is met, Theorems 1 and 2 thus imply
that the set of sequential equilibrium payoffs SECδ converges to the set E(M).
Checking whether a given payoff vector U(µ, y) belongs to E(M) seems to require the
computation of the extreme points of the set M, which is not an easy task. Fortunately, it
turns out that condition C1 is equivalent to a much simpler condition.
Lemma 3 Let y : S → ∆(B) be given. Conditions C1 and D1 are respectively equivalent to
conditions Q2 and Q’2 below.
Q2.
∑
s∈S
u1(s, y(· | s)) ≥
∑
s∈S
u1(s, y(· | φ(s))), for every permutation φ over S.
Q’2.
∑
s∈S
u1(s, y(· | s)) >
∑
s∈S
u1(s, y(· | φ(s))), for every permutation φ 6= id over S.
Interestingly, conditions Q2 and Q’2 do not involve the invariant distribution m.
The statement of Theorem 1 is unsatisfactory in one important respect: while non-empty
interior requirements in existing Folk Theorems are generically satisfied, the condition Ê(M) 6=
∅ is not, as the next example shows.
Example 4 Consider the game depicted in Figure 2, where there are two states, and the re-
ceiver has two actions.
l r
1, 1 0, 0
State L
l r
1, 1 0, 0
State R
Figure 2: The game in Example 4.
Here, v2 = 1, and the stationary strategy y∗ which plays l irrespective of the announcement
is the only stationary strategy that satisfies C2. Hence, E(M) contains a single payoff vector,
(1, 1), and Ê(M) is empty. When payoffs are slightly perturbed, the strategy y∗ remains the
only strategy satisfying C2, therefore Ê(M) = ∅ for any such perturbation. 
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Example 4 suggests that if all strategies y for which U(µ0, y) is in E(M) are constant
strategies, then the set Ê(M) is empty, even when payoffs in the game are slightly perturbed.
We build on this intuition, and introduce a new condition.
Condition B. There is a non-constant map y : S → ∆(B) such that U(µ0, y) ∈ E(M).
In Theorem 5 below, we fix the transition function of the Markov chain p, and identify a
game to a point in the space R2×S×B of payoff functions.
Theorem 5 Let a game G be given.
If condition B holds for G, then any neighborhood of G contains a game G′ with ÊG′(M) 6=
∅.
If condition B does not hold for G, there is a neighborhood N of G such that, for every
game in N , condition B does not hold.
Theorem 5 allows us to complete the picture provided by Theorems 1 and 2, provided the
underlying Markov chain satisfies Assumption A. Indeed, let G be a game. If Condition B
holds for G, Theorems 1 and 2 provide a characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs
for games arbitrarily close to G. If condition B does not hold for G, then all games close enough
to G have only babbling equilibrium payoffs.
4.2 Comments
The relation between transitions and equilibria.
Note that the setM of copulas only depends on the invariant measure m, and not on finer
details of the transition function. A striking implication of the characterization is that, under
Assumption A, the limit set of equilibrium payoffs therefore only depends on the invariant
measure m. In particular, the limit set of equilibrium payoffs is the same as when the states
are drawn independently across stages. That is, the amount of state persistence is irrelevant
for the determination of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs.
This property hinges on Assumption A, and may fail to hold more generally, as we will
show through an example.
If the initial state s were to remain fixed throughout the play, the game would fall into
the class of repeated games with incomplete information introduced by Aumann and Maschler
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(1995). (This is the setup studied in Golosov et al. (2009)). In this case, the limit set of
discounted equilibrium payoffs, when δ goes to 1, is typically not equal to E(M). Hence, there
is a discontinuity in the limit set of equilibrium payoffs when successive states become perfectly
autocorrelated.9
By contrast, for a fixed discount factor, the set of equilibrium payoffs is upper hemi-
continuous with respect to the transition function. The source of this apparent paradox can
be traced back to the fact that, in loose terms, the convergence of the set SECδ to E(M) is
slowlier, the more successive states are correlated.
Equilibrium behavior.
Our construction (to be made precise in later sections), has the somewhat surprising feature
that the sender reports truthfully, at least most of the time and with high probability. A direct
intuition can be provided, that is reminiscent of the revelation principle in mechanism design.
Let an equilibrium (σ, τ) be given. Consider the strategy profile where the sender reports
truthfully, and the receiver first computes the message that the strategy σ would have sent,
and next plays what τ would have played given this message. We argue loosely that this new
profile (when supplemented with threats) is an equilibrium. The key to the argument is twofold.
On the one hand, the sender can check that the receiver does indeed play as prescribed, and does
not use the additional information provided by the knowledge of the true state. On the other
hand, the threat of switching to the babbling equilibrium is effective because the knowledge of
the state at a given stage becomes eventually valueless in predicting distant stages, because of
the irreducibility property of the sequence of states.
The impact of repetition on the players.
The characterization implies that every equilibrium payoff of the one-shot game remains an
equilibrium payoff in the dynamic game, provided players are patient enough. We stress that
this property is not obvious here, since the game is not a repeated game. In particular, it would
typically fail to hold if the state were constant throughout the play.
Let (σ, τ) be an equilibrium of the one-shot game. Let y : S → ∆(B) be the stationary
strategy defined as
y(b | a) =
∑
s∈S
σ(a | s)τ(a)[b].
9Our Theorems 1 and 2 extend to cover the case of uniform equilibrium payoffs.
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Note that the expected payoff under (σ, τ) is U(µ0, y). We claim that U(µ0, y) ∈ E(M), so
that by Theorem 1 it is a sequential equilibrium payoff in the repeated game. Indeed, because
the receiver can guarantee v2 in the one-shot game, condition C2 holds. Because σ is a best
reply to τ in the one-shot game, the inequality in C1 holds for every µ, and in particular for
every µ ∈M.
This result has the implication that the lowest equilibrium payoff of the sender in the
repeated game cannot be higher than his lowest equilibrium payoff in the one shot game. As
the example in Section 3 shows, it can be in fact strictly lower.
On the other hand, the lowest equilibrium payoff of the receiver in both the one-shot game
and the repeated game is equal to his babbling equilibrium payoff v2.
The information of the sender.
Theorems 1 and 2 hold as soon as the sender knows the current state. As will be clear
from the proof, they continue to hold if the sender knows more. In particular, they hold in the
extreme case where the sender learns the entire sequence of realized states in stage 1, or in any
intermediate setup.
The assumption Ê(M) 6= ∅.
In the light of the existing results for repeated games, it is not surprising that some non-
empty interiority type of assumption is needed. We refer to Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for
a survey on similar results and a discussion of the role of this assumption.
As the next example illustrates, the conclusion of Theorem 1 fails to hold if Ê(M) = ∅.
Example 6 Let there be two states and two actions for the receiver. The payoffs in the two
states are given by the tables in Figure 3. We assume that the successive states are independent
and that the two states are equally likely.
l r
0.5, 1 1, 1
State L
l r
0, 0 1, 1
State R
Figure 3: The game in Example 6.
The strategy which plays r irrespective of the announcement is weakly dominant in the one-
shot game, and thus, v2 = 1. Consider now the stationary strategy y defined by y(l | L) = y(r |
R) = 1. The payoff vector U(µ0, y) = (
3
4
, 1) is in E(M). However, we claim that (1, 1) is the
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unique equilibrium payoff, irrespective of δ. Here is the reason. Consider any equilibrium (σ, τ).
Plainly, the equilibrium payoff of the receiver is equal to 1. In particular, with probability 1
the receiver plays r whenever the current state is R. This implies that in every stage, and for
a.e. past history, there is one (possibly history-dependent) message following which the receiver
plays r, and which is assigned positive probability by σ. But then, the sender gets a payoff 1
by assigning probability 1 to this specific message in every stage. 
On the role of Assumption A.
As the next example shows, the conclusion of Theorem 2 fails to hold if Assumption A
is not satisfied. Thus, in general, the limit set of sequential equilibrium payoffs does not only
depend on the invariant measure, but also on fine details of the transition function.
Example 7 Consider a game with 5 states S := {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. The sequence of states follows a
random walk on S. When in s, the chain moves either to s+1 (mod 5) or to s−1 (mod 5) with
equal probabilities. The action set B of the receiver coincides with S, and the payoff function
is described in Figure 4, where c > 1.
b = 0 b = 1 b = 2 b = 3 b = 4
s = 0
s = 1
s = 2
s = 3
s = 4 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 1, 1
0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 1, 1 0, 0
0, 0 0, 0 1, 1 0, 0 0, 0
c, 0 1, 1 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
1, 1 c, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
Figure 4: The game in Example 7.
Thus, both players receive a payoff 1 if the action matches the current state, and 0 otherwise,
except when the receiver chooses action 1 in state 0, or action 0 in state 1.
The payoff vector (1, 1) is not in E(M) as soon as c > 1. Indeed, the stationary strategy
y : S → ∆(B) defined by y(s | s) = 1 is the only strategy such that U(µ0, y) = (1, 1). But
then, the sender profits by reporting t = 1 whenever s = 0, and t = 0 whenever s = 1. On the
other hand, (1, 1) is an equilibrium payoffs, as soon as c < 3
2
, provided the players are patient
enough. Indeed, consider the strategy of the receiver in which he matches the announcement of
the sender, as long as |tn+1−tn| = 1 modulo 5, and switches forever to the babbling equilibrium
(e.g., playing always b = 4) if |tn+1 − tn| 6= 1 modulo 5 for some stage n. Provided c is not
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too large, the best response of the sender is to report the true state. If instead, say, the sender
chooses to report t = 1 when in fact s = 0 in a given stage, he gains c− 1, but then in the next
period, with probability 1
2
the new state will be s = 4, and then he will either report t ∈ {0, 2}
and receive 0, or report t ∈ {1, 3, 4} and be punished with the babbling equilibrium payoff 1
5
forever. Provided the players are patient enough, such a deviation is not profitable.
In this equilibrium, the receiver checks that the one-step transitions between successive
announcements are consistent with the transitions of the Markov chain. As it turns out, under
Assumption A, such a sophisticated statistical analysis of the announcements is not more
powerful than a statistical analysis which is based only on the empirical frequencies of the
different announcements. 
Undiscounted payoffs.
An alternative way of studying long-term strategic aspects is to consider uniform equilibrium
payoffs.10 Our results get simplified and we obtain that under Assumption A, the set of
uniform equilibrium payoffs coincide with E(M).
Imperfect monitoring.
Let us assume here that successive states are independent. Results continue to hold if the
receiver only observes a noisy, public version of the sender’s message (provided the definition
of U(µ, y) is modified in an appropriate way). They still hold if the receiver observes a noisy,
public signal of the current state, provided the individual rationality level v2 is modified in the
proper way. They also hold, without changes, if the sender only observes a noisy, public signal
of the receiver’s action. What happens in any of these variants when signals are private is
beyond the scope of the paper.
We briefly conclude this section by discussing the case where the sender fails to receive any
information relative to the receiver’s choices. In spite of this feature, the game does not reduce
to a sequence of successive, independent, one-shot games, because of the ability of the receiver
to monitor the sender. In particular, it is easy to construct examples with equilibrium payoffs
that lie outside of the convex hull of the set of equilibrium payoffs in the one-shot game.
10A strategy pair (σ, τ) is a uniform equilibrium if for every  > 0, (σ, τ) is a δ-discounted ε-equilibrium for
every discount factor δ sufficiently close to 1. Any payoff vector that is the limit of the δ-discounted payoffs
that correspond to a uniform equilibrium (σ, τ), as δ goes to 1, is a uniform equilibrium payoff.
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We refer to the game where the sender does not observe the actions of the receiver as to
the blind game. Denote by NEbδ the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs of the blind game. We
prove that the value of monitoring is positive, in the sense that allowing the sender to monitor
the receiver has a non-ambiguous effect on the equilibrium set. Note that because the sender
does not observe the receiver’s choices, the set NEbδ is also the set of Nash equilibrium in the
blind game when there is a correlation device that outputs a uniformly distributed number in
[0, 1] before the receiver makes his choice.
Proposition 8 The set NEbδ is a subset of NECδ.
The inclusion is strict in general, as Example 9 below shows.
Example 9 There are two states S = {L,R}, and three actions for the receiver, B = {l,m, r}.
The payoffs in the two states are given in Figure 5.
l m r
2, 2 0, 0 0, 0
State L
l m r
0, 0 2, 2 0, 3
State R
Figure 5: The game in Example 9.
We claim that (2, 2) is an equilibrium payoff when the sender observes the actions of the
receiver, but it is no longer an equilibrium payoff when the sender does not observe the receiver’s
actions.
Note first that v2 = 3
2
, and that Ê(M) 6= ∅. By Theorem 1, (2, 2) ∈ E(M), so that
(2, 2) ∈ lim infδ→1 SECδ ⊆ lim infδ→1NECδ.
We now argue that (2, 2) is bounded away from the set NEbδ . Indeed, assume to the contrary
that there is some equilibrium profile (σ, τ) of the blind game with a payoff close to (2, 2). In
particular, with a probability close to one, there is a positive fraction of the stages in which the
current state is R and the receiver plays m. Consider the strategy τ ′ which plays as τ , except
that τ ′ plays r whenever τ would play m. Because the sender does not observe the receiver’s
actions, he cannot tell whether the receiver uses τ or τ ′, and therefore τ ′ is a profitable deviation
of the receiver: it yields the receiver payoff close to 21
2
. 
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4.3 On the role of the randomizing device
The randomizing device is not needed in the proof of Theorem 2 to implement payoffs U(µ0, y),
whenever y(· | s) is a pure strategy: it assigns probability 1 to some action b(s), for each s ∈ S.
However, as soon as y(· | s) is a truly mixed distribution for some state s, it may be impossible
to dispense with the randomizing device, as we now argue by means of an example.
Let there be two states, L and R. The successive states are drawn independently in every
period, and each of the two states is equally likely. The receiver has three actions, denoted
B = {l,m, r}. The payoffs are given in Figure 6.
l m r
3, 0 0, 4 2, 1
State L
l m r
1,−5 4,−4 2, 1
State R
Figure 6: The payoffs of the players.
Plainly, v2 = 1. Define y∗ to be the stationary strategy such that y∗(· | R) assigns probability
1 to r, and y∗(· | L) assigns probabilities 23 and 13 to l andm, respectively. Then U(µ0, y) = (2, 76),
and one can verify that U(µ0, y∗) ∈ E(M) while Ê(M) 6= ∅. Thus, using Theorem 1, the vector
(2, 7
6
) can be approximated by sequential equilibrium payoffs, when players are sufficiently
patient, provided a randomizing device is available.
We now assume that such a device is not available. Since successive states are independent,
the dynamic game can be viewed as a infinite repetition of the one-shot information transmission
game. With this interpretation, an action of the sender in the one-shot game is a map x : S →
A, while an action of the receiver is a map y : A → B. Given an action profile (x, y), payoffs
are random, and take the value u(s, y(x(s))) with probability m(s), for s ∈ S. Players then
receive the public signal (x(s), y(x(s))).
We will rely on Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin’s (1994) characterization of the limit set of
perfect public equilibrium (PPE) payoffs in repeated games with public signals. Some care is
needed, as there are two dimensions according to which our repeated game does not fit into
their setup. First, they assume that a player’s payoff depends deterministically on his own
action and on the public signal, while payoffs here depend randomly on the entire action profile
(x, y). Second, their result is a characterization of public equilibrium payoffs, while we focus
on sequential equilibrium payoffs.
We briefly argue that their result nevertheless applies to our setting. On the one hand, their
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result is still valid for games where payoffs depend on the entire action profile.11 Next, it can
be verified that the auxiliary game in which stage payoffs are defined to be the expected stage
payoffs in our game (given the action profile) has the same set of PPE payoffs. Thus, their
result provides a characterization of the limit set of PPE payoffs for our game. On the other
hand, let (σ, τ) be a sequential equilibrium of our game, and define a public strategy profile
(σ¯, τ¯) as follows. Let any public history h¯ be given. At h¯, we let σ¯ play the expectation of
the mixed move played by σ, where the expectation is computed w.r.t. the belief held by the
receiver at the information set which contains h¯. We define τ¯(h) by exchanging the roles of the
two players. It can be verified that (σ¯, τ¯) is a public perfect equilibrium of the repeated game.
Fudenberg et al. (1994) showed that γ ∈ R2 is a PPE payoff if and only if for all λ ∈ R2
we have λ · γ ≤ k(λ), where k(λ) is the solution to a certain optimization problem P(λ).
We set γ = (2, 7
6
), and we will show that it is not a PPE Payoff using the condition of
Fudenberg et al. (1994) with λ∗ = (0, 1). We now recall Fudenberg et al. (1994) definition of
k(λ∗), and we will show that λ∗ · γ > k(λ∗), implying that γ is not a PPE payoff.
We denote by Z = A × B the set of public signals in our game. The quantity k(λ∗) is
defined as the value of the optimization problem P :
supV 2,
where the supremum is taken over all (V 1, V 2) ∈ R2, and all φ : Z → R2, such that
• φ2(z) ≤ 0 for every z ∈ Z;
• (V 1, V 2) is a Nash equilibrium payoff of the one-shot game, with payoff function defined
by: ∑
s∈S
m(s) (u(s, y(x(s))) + φ(x(s), y(x(s)))) , (2)
for each action pair (x, y).
Let φ : Z → R2 be any map such that φ2(z) ≤ 0 for each z ∈ Z, and let (α, β) be any
(possibly mixed) equilibrium of the one-shot game (2), with payoff (V 1, V 2). We will prove
that V 2 < 7
6
. We argue by contradiction, and assume that V 2 ≥ 7
6
. We distinguish between
two cases.
11This can be seen from their proof or, alternatively, deduced from Ho¨rner et al. (2009).
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Assume first that α : S → ∆(A) is pooling: the distribution of messages is the same in both
states. Then, since φ2(z) ≤ 0, the expected payoff of the receiver is not higher than
max
b∈B
∑
s∈S
m(s)u2(s, b) = 1.
Thus, V 2 ≤ 1 < 7
6
, which is the desired contradiction.
Assume next that α is not pooling. Up to a relabelling of the messages, we may then assume
w.l.o.g. that the sender always tells the truth with positive probability. That is, α(s | s) > 0,
for each s ∈ S. We denote by β˜(· | s) the conditional distribution of the receiver’s move under
(α, β), conditional on the state being s ∈ S. Denoting by s 6= t the two states, the equilibrium
property for the sender in the game (2) then implies that∑
b∈B
β(b | s) (u1(s, b) + φ1(s, b)) ≥∑
b∈B
β(b | t) (u1(s, b) + φ1(t, b)) ,
with equality if α(· | s) assigns positive probability to both messages, and∑
b∈B
β(b | t) (u1(t, b) + φ1(t, b)) ≥∑
b∈B
β(b | s) (u1(t, b) + φ1(s, b)) .
Using the two inequalities, one can verify that
u1(s, β˜(· | s)) + u1(t, β˜(· | t)) ≥ u1(s, β˜(· | t)) + u1(t, β˜(· | s)).
By Lemma 3, condition C2 therefore holds for the stationary strategy β˜.
On the other hand, since φ2(z) ≤ 0 for each z, the expected payoff V 2 to the receiver does
not exceed U2(µ0, β˜). Hence, U
2(µ0, β˜) ≥ 76 . This readily implies that U(µ0, β˜) ∈ E(M).
Next, one can verify that the highest payoff U2(µ0, β˜) to the receiver, over the whole set
U(µ0, β˜) ∈ E(M), is equal to 76 . In addition, the unique strategy β˜ that achieves such a payoff
is the strategy y∗. Since the supports of y∗(L) and y∗(·| R) are distinct, it must therefore be
that α is truth-telling: α(s | s) = 1 for each s. Therefore, β is equal to y∗.
Since V 2 ≥ 7
6
and V 2 ≤ U2(µ0, y∗), one also has V 2 = U2(µ0, y∗). In particular, the
expectation of φ2(z) under the equilibrium profile (α, β) must be equal to zero. Since φ2(z) ≤ 0
for each z, this implies that φ2(z) = 0, for each public signal z that receives positive probability
under (α, β).
Using this, we finally claim that the equilibrium condition for the receiver in the game (2)
is violated. Indeed, when told L, the strategy β = y∗ assigns positive probability to both l and
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m. Hence, φ2(L, l) = φ2(L,m) = 0 by the previous paragraph. On the other hand however,
u2(L,m) > u2(L, l), hence the receiver is not indifferent between both actions. This is the
desired contradiction.
5 Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2, and of Proposition 8
In the present section we provide the main steps in the proof of Theorems 1 and 2. The technical
parts of the proofs are relegated to the appendix. The proof of Theorem 5, which is particular
to the model we study, also appears in the appendix.
5.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Denote the set of all stationary strategies of the receiver that induce a payoff in E(M) by
Y (M) = {y : S → ∆(B) such that U(µ0, y) ∈ E(M)}.
Because E(M) is defined by linear inequalities, Y (M) is convex. Since Ê(M) 6= ∅, there is
y0 : S → ∆(B) such that U2(µ0, y0) > v2 and U1(µ0, y0) > U1(µ, y0) for every µ ∈ M, µ 6= µ0.
Fix ε > 0 once and for all.
Define Yε(M) := εy0 + (1 − ε)Y (M), and Eε(M) = U(µ0, Yε(M)). Because Y (M) and
E(M) are convex, Yε(M) ⊆ Y (M), and Eε(M) = εU(µ0, y0) + (1− ε)E(M) ⊆ Ê(M).
We will prove the existence of δ0 < 1, such that Eε(M) ⊆ SECδ for every δ ≥ δ0. This will
imply supγ∈E(M) d(γ, SECδ)→ 0, as desired.
5.1.1 A lower bound for U1(µ0, y)− U1(µ, y)
By C1, the difference U1(µ0, y)−U1(µ, y) is non-negative for every µ ∈ E(M) and y ∈ Y (M).
We now provide a lower bound to this difference, in terms of the finitely many extreme points
of M.
Denote by Me the (finite) set of extreme points of M. Recall that µ0 ∈Me. Set
c1 := min{µe∈Me,µe 6=µ0}
(
U1(µ0, y0)− U1(µe, y0)
)
, and c2 := max{µe∈Me,µe 6=µ0}
‖µe − µ0‖1.
Note that both c1 and c2 are positive.
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Lemma 10 For every ε > 0, y ∈ Yε(M) and µ ∈M, one has
U1(µ0, y)− U1(µ, y) ≥ εc1
c2
‖µ− µ0‖1.
Proof. See Appendix.
For each N ∈ N, let mN be the distribution over S that best approximates m among all
distributions with rational coefficients whose denominator is N . Plainly, limN→∞ ‖mN −m‖1 =
0.
5.1.2 The strategies
Let y ∈ Yε(M) be given. We construct a sequential equilibrium (σ∗, τ∗) with payoff close to
U(µ0, y). The definition depends on an integer N ∈ N and on the discount factor δ.
We start by defining a periodic strategy profile (σ0, τ0) with period N that yields payoff close
to U(µ0, y). We divide the play into blocks of length N . At the beginning of each block, both
players discard all previously held information, and re-start playing as from stage 1. Therefore,
we focus on one block, say the first block.
Recall that tn ∈ S stands for the announcement of the sender in stage n. Given s ∈ S,
and n ∈ N, we denote by Nn(s) = |{k ≤ n : tk = s}| the number of stages where the sender
announced the state to be s. We set
q := min{1 ≤ n ≤ B : Nn(tn) > NmN(tn)}
(min ∅ = +∞). The interpretation is as follows. Each state s ∈ S is allotted a quota of
announcements in the block, equal to the product N mN(s). The stage q is the first stage in
which the announcements of the sender exceed one of the quotas.
According to τ0, the receiver ‘listens’ to the announcements of the sender until stage q. At
that stage, the receiver starts following a predetermined sequence of fictitious announcements.
To be formal, we let (tn) be a process with the following properties:
F1. tn = tn for n < q;
F2. For each s ∈ S, the equality |{n ≤ N : tn = s}| = NmN(s) always hold;
F3. Conditional on (t1, . . . , tq), the variables (tq, . . . , tN) are deterministic.
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We will refer to tn as the announcement at stage n. Condition F1 ensures that the announce-
ments coincide with the true announcements prior to stage q; condition F2 ensures that the
entire sequence of announcements always satisfies the quotas; condition F3 ensures in particular
that the fictitious announcements are commonly known between the two players. The strategy
τ0 plays the mixed action y(tn) in each stage n = 1, . . . , N .
Let σ0 be a pure best-reply strategy to τ0 in the δ-discounted game. Several remarks are in
order.
• We impose that, following any history that is consistent with τ0, σ0 is a best-reply of the
sender in the continuation game.12
• Since τ0 starts anew at the beginning of each block, we may and will assume that σ0 has
the same property, as long as the play is consistent with τ0.
A little care is needed to construct a sequential equilibrium in pure strategies based on
(σ0, τ0).
The first step is to transform τ0 into a pure strategy. Here we use the public correlation
device that sends a public message at every stage after the announcement of the sender. Denote
by Xn the public signal at stage n. The random variables (Xn) are i.i.d. uniformly distributed
over [0, 1]. We will use this sequence to de-randomize τ0. Label the receiver’s actions from 1 to
|B|. Instead of playing the mixed action y(tn), the strategy τ0 instructs the receiver to choose
the action b ∈ B whenever
b−1∑
i=1
y(i | tn) ≤ Xn <
b∑
i=1
y(i | tn). Thus, τ0 can be viewed as a pure
strategy. Note that because the signals (Xn)n are public, a deviation from the de-randomized
strategy is detected by the sender.
We denote by σ∗ the strategy of the sender that coincides with σ0 as long as the receiver
does not deviate from τ0, and after a deviation repeats the same (babbling) announcement a¯.
We next address the issue of designing a system of beliefs for the receiver that is consistent
with σ∗, and that satisfies an additional property. Since the game involves randomizing devices
with uncountably many outcomes, the standard definition of consistency does not apply. We
denote by λ ∈ ∆(S) a distribution with full support and, for η < 0, we denote by ση the
strategy that, following any history hn, plays ηλ+ (1− η)σ∗(hn).
12That is, we also impose the best-reply condition following histories that are consistent with τ0, but not with
σ0.
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One can check that, for η > 0, the beliefs of the receiver are uniquely defined by Bayes rule,
and have a limit when η = 0.13 Note that, following any history that is inconsistent with τ0,
the belief of the receiver in stage n is independent of tn.
14
We denote by τ∗ a strategy that coincides with τ0 as long as the sender does not deviate,
and that plays in each later stage n an action that (i) maximizes the current expected payoff
of the receiver, given the belief held by the receiver in stage n, and (ii) does not depend on the
announcements made by the sender since the deviation took place.
By construction, the strategy σ∗ is sequentially rational at each node of the sender, while
the strategy τ∗ is sequentially rational at each node of the receiver that is inconsistent with τ0.
We emphasize that the pure strategy profile (σ∗, τ∗) depends on N and on δ, even if this
does not appear explicitly in the notation.
5.1.3 Equilibrium properties
We here show that for every η > 0, there is an integer N0 ∈ N such that the following holds.
For every N ≥ N0, there is δ0 < 1 such that, for every δ ≥ δ0, the profile (σ∗, τ∗) is a sequential
equilibrium, and induces a payoff within η of U(µ0, y).
Denote by µσ0,τ0 the expected (undiscounted) joint distribution of the pair (sn, tn) over a
block of N stages. That is, for each (s, t) ∈ S × S,
µσ0,τ0(s, t) := Eσ0,τ0
[
1
N
N∑
n=1
1{sn=s,tn=t}
]
is the expected frequency of the pair (s, t) over N stages.
The announcement tn might differ from sn because σ0 is a best response to τ0, and the
optimal message of the sender need not coincide with the true state. The following proposition
shows that nevertheless tn = sn with high probability.
Proposition 11 For every η > 0, there is N0 ∈ N, such that the following holds. For every
N ≥ N0, there is δ0 < 1, such that, for every δ ≥ δ0, one has
‖µσ0,τ0 − µ0‖ < η.
13And the convergence is uniform w.r.t. the receiver’s information set.
14That is, should the sender fail to play the babbling announcement a¯, the receiver sill interprets the sender’s
announcements as babbling.
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We first argue that Proposition 11 implies the desired result. Since the proof is standard,
we limit ourselves to a sketch of the proof, and omit the details. Observe first that by the
definition of µσ0,τ0 , the expected average
15 payoff induced by (σ0, τ0) over a single block is
equal to U(µσ0,τ0 , y). Since the profile (σ0, τ0) is periodic, for fixed N , as δ approaches one, the
discounted payoff induced by (σ0, τ0) converges to U(µσ0,τ0 , y) and is thus arbitrarily close to
the target payoff U(µ0, y).
The construction in Section 5.1.2 implies that it suffices to check the sequential rationality
of τ0 at any information set that is consistent with τ0. If the receiver fails to play the action
prescribed by τ0, the sender will switch to a babbling play, announcing a¯ forever, and the
receiver’s continuation payoff therefore does not exceed (1− δ)
∞∑
k=n
δk−n max
b∈B
u2(pk, b), where pk
is the belief that the receiver will hold at stage k ≥ n on the current state sk. Since the sequence
of states forms an irreducible and aperiodic chain, pk converges to m. As δ approaches one, the
receiver’s continuation payoff therefore converges to v2.
Assume instead that the receiver sticks to τ0. His continuation payoff is then equal to the
sum of his payoffs until the end of the current block and of the continuation payoff from the
next block on, which is the discounted payoff induced by (σ0, τ0). For fixed N , as δ approaches
one, this continuation payoff converges to U2(µσ0,τ0 , y). Since U
2(µσ0,τ0 , y) > v
2, this proves the
sequential rationality of τ0, provided first N , and then δ, are chosen large enough.
Proof of Proposition 11. Define by σtruth the strategy of the sender that announces
truthfully the current state sn in each stage n ≤ N , and by τtruth the strategy of the receiver
that plays y(tn) in each stage n ≤ N . Thus, τtruth coincides with τ0 until stage q.
Let η be given, and set ξ = η|S|+2 . For every state s ∈ S and every n ∈ N, denote by
Fn(s) the empirical frequency of visits to s up to (and including) stage n. Since the Markov
chain is aperiodic, by the ergodic theorem there is N0 such that with probability at least 1− ξ,
F(1−ξ)N(s) ≤ mN(S) for every state s ∈ S, provided N ≥ N0. It follows that τ0 coincides with
τtruth in the first (1− ξ)N stages, so that with probability at least 1− ξ,
‖µσtruth,τ0 − µ0‖1 ≤ |S|ξ.
15That is, when payoffs in the different stages are not discounted.
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Because payoffs are in the interval [0, 1], this implies that
U1(µσtruth,τ0 , y) > U
1(µ0, y)− (|S|+ 1)ξ.
For fixed N , as δ converges to 1, the discounted payoff in each block converges to the average
payoff in that block, and therefore for δ sufficiently large
γ1δ (σtruth, τ0) > U
1(µ0, y)− (|S|+ 2)ξ.
Because σ0 is a best reply to τ0, we deduce that
γ1δ (σ0, τ0) ≥ γ1δ (σtruth, τ0) > U1(µ0, y)− (|S|+ 2)ξ = U1(µ0, y)− η.
We again use the fact that, for fixed N , as δ goes to 1, the payoff γδ(σ0, τ0) converges to
U(µσ0,τ0 , y) to deduce that
U1(µσ0,τ0 , y) > U
1(µ0, y)− η. (3)
For fixed N , and for every δ, the marginal distributions of µσ0,τ0 ∈ ∆(S × T ) on S and T
are respectively equal to m and to mN .
Since the approximation mN converges to m as N → +∞, the distribution µσ0,τ0 converges
to the set M of copulas. Using Lemma 10, Proposition 11 therefore follows from (3).
5.2 Proof of Theorem 2
We here discuss the logic behind the proof of Theorem 2. We let δ < 1, and we fix a Nash
equilibrium (σ, τ) of the δ-discounted game (with or without randomizing device). For s ∈ S,
we define y(· | s) ∈ ∆(B) as the expected discounted distribution of moves of the receiver in
state s. Formally, for s ∈ S, and b ∈ B, we set
y(b | s) = 1
m(s)
Eσ,τ
[ ∞∑
n=1
(1− δ)δn−11{sn=s,bn=b}
]
=
Eσ,τ
[∑∞
n=1(1− δ)δn−11{sn=s,bn=b}
]
Eσ,τ
[∑∞
n=1(1− δ)δn−11{sn=s}
] .
By construction, one has γδ(σ, τ) = U(µ0, y). Indeed,
γδ(σ, τ) = (1− δ)
∞∑
n=1
δn−1Eσ,τ [u(sn,bn)] = (1− δ)
∞∑
n=1
δn−1
∑
s∈S,b∈B
Eσ,τ [1{sn=s,bn=b}]u(s, b)
=
∑
s∈S,b∈B
u(s, b)m(s)y(b | s) = U(µ0, y),
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as desired.
Since the distribution of sn is equal to m for each stage n ∈ N, one has γ2δ (σ, τ) ≥ v2, and
thus, U2(µ0, y) ≥ v2, so that C2 holds.
We will prove that for every µ ∈M, there is a strategy σ′ of the sender, such that γ(σ′, τ) =
U(µ, y), so that the inequality U1(µ0, y) ≥ U1(µ, y) will follow from the equilibrium property,
and C1 holds as well.
As previous discussions have hinted, the construction of σ′ relies on the sender simulating a
sequence (tn)n of fictitious states, that he will substitute to the true states (sn)n when playing
σ. The construction of this sequence requires much technical work.
DefineM′ ⊆ ∆(S×T ) to be the set of distributions µ ∈M such that the following property
P holds:
Property P. For every (s, t) ∈ S × T , one has∑
s′∈S
µ(s′ | t)p(s | s′) =
∑
t′∈T
µ(s | t′)p(t′ | t). (4)
We prove in the Appendix the following two lemmas.
Lemma 12 Under Assumption A, the set M′ coincides with the set M.
Lemma 13 Let µ ∈M′ be given. There exists an S-valued process16 (tn)n, such that:
P1 The law of the sequence (tn)n is the same as the law of the sequence (sn)n.
P2 The law of the pair (sn, tn) is µ, for each stage n ∈ N.
P3 The conditional law of sn, given t1, . . . , tn is µ(· | tn).
P4 Conditional on sn, the vector (t1, . . . , tn) is independent of the future states (sn+1, sn+2, . . .).
We emphasize that only Lemma 12 makes use of Assumption A. This has the following
consequence. Given µ ∈ M′, using Lemma 13 and the construction that follows, one has
U1(µ0, y) ≥ U1(µ, y). Thus, the conclusion U1(µ0, y) = maxµ∈M′ U1(µ, y) holds, irrespective of
whether Assumption A is met or not.
16The process (tn)n is possibly defined on a probability space which is an enlargement of the one on which
(sn)n is defined.
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We will interpret the states (tn)n as fictitious states, which are constructed by the sender
using the sequence (sn)n of true states. Condition P1 implies that the sequence of fictitious
states is statistically indistinguishable from (sn)n. Condition P4 ensures that fictitious states
can be computed, using only the information available at stage n.
Intuitively, given the true states (sn)n, the strategy σ
′ generates the fictitious states (tn)n,
and plays according to σ, as if the realized states were given by tn. Conditions P2 and P3
in Lemma 13 will ensure that the correlation between the true and the fictitious states is such
that γδ(σ
′, τ) = U(µ, y).
The strategy σ′ takes as inputs the true states to generate fictitious states, and then
mimics σ. Formally, we let (tn)n be a process such that P1-4 hold. Following any history
(s1, t1, a1, b1, . . . , sn−1, tn−1, an−1, bn−1, sn, tn), the strategy σ′ plays the mixed move σ(t1, a1, b1, . . . , tn) ∈
∆(A).
We now proceed to show that the expected payoff induced by (σ′, τ) is equal to U(µ, y), as
claimed.
Below we will denote by sk, tk, bk generic values of the random variables sk, tk and bk,
respectively. For any given stage n ∈ N, the following sequence of equalities holds:
Eσ′,τ [u(sn,bn)] =
∑
sn,bn
Pσ′,τ (sn = sn,bn = bn)u(sn, bn)
=
∑
sn
∑
t1,...,tn
∑
b1,...,bn
Pσ′,τ (sn, t1, . . . , tn, b1, . . . , bn)u(sn, bn) (5)
=
∑
sn
∑
t1,...,tn
∑
b1,...,bn
Pσ′,τ (sn | t1, . . . , tn, b1, . . . , bn)Pσ′,τ (t1, . . . , tn, b1, . . . , bn)u(sn, bn)
=
∑
sn
∑
t1,...,tn
∑
b1,...,bn
P(sn | t1, . . . , tn)Pσ′,τ (t1, . . . , tn, b1, . . . , bn)u(sn, bn) (6)
=
∑
sn
∑
t1,...,tn
∑
b1,...,bn
µ(sn | tn)Pσ′,τ (t1, . . . , tn, b1, . . . , bn)u(sn, bn) (7)
=
∑
sn,tn,bn
µ(sn | tn)Pσ′,τ (tn, bn)u(sn, bn), (8)
(9)
where (6) holds because (bk) are independent of sn, and (7) holds by P3.
Using P1, and by the definition of σ′, the δ-discounted sum of Pσ′,τ (tn = tn,b = bn) is
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equal to Pσ,τ (sn = tn,b = bn), which is equal to µ(tn)× y(bn | tn). By (9) we now obtain
γδ(σ
′, τ) =
∑
s,t,b
µ(s | t)µ(t)y(b | t)u(s, b) = U(µ, y).
5.3 Proof of Proposition 8
Let (σ, τ) be a Nash equilibrium of the blind game. Define τ ′ to be the following strategy that
depends only on the sender’s announcements, and not on the receiver’s past actions: after a
sequence (a1, . . . , an) of announcements, τ
′ plays any action b ∈ B with the probability that
the n-th action of the receiver according to τ is b, conditional on the sender’s announcements
being (a1, . . . , an):
τ ′(a1, . . . , an)[b] = E [τ(a1, b1, a2, b2, . . . , bn−1, an)[b] | a1, a2, . . . , an] .
In words, τ ′ gets rid of the possible correlation between successive actions of the receiver, that
may exist in the strategy τ .
We claim that the strategy profile (σ, τ ′) is a Nash equilibrium of the blind game. Indeed,
τ ′ is a best-reply to σ because it induces the same payoff as τ . σ is a best-reply to τ ′ because
any strategy of the sender in the blind game induces the same expected payoff against τ or τ ′.
We next claim that the strategy profile (σ, τ ′) is a Nash equilibrium of the non-blind game.
Indeed, because under σ, the sender does not condition his play on past actions of the receiver,
and because τ ′ is a best response to σ in the blind game, it follows that τ ′ is a best response to
σ in the non-blind game as well. Because the receiver’s actions are conditionally independent,
given the sender’s announcements, any profitable deviation against τ ′ in the non-blind game is
also profitable in the blind game.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 3
To prove Lemma 3 we need the following description of M, which is of independent interest.
A permutation matrix is a (square) matrix with entries in {0, 1}, such that each row and
each column contains exactly one entry equal to 1. We denote by Φ the set of S×S permutation
matrices, and by I the matrix that corresponds to the identity permutation.
Lemma 14 The set M(m) is equal to
M(m) = (µ0 − I + co Φ) ∩RS×S+ .
Proof. The inclusion ⊇ is clear. We prove the reverse inclusion. Take µ in M(m), and
define the matrix J := µ + I − µ0 in RS×S. J is a bistochastic matrix, hence it is a convex
combination of permutation matrices. Since µ = J − I + µ0, the result follows.
Proof of Lemma 3. We only prove that C1 is equivalent to Q2. For every permutation
φ over S denote by µφ ∈ S×S the matrix where the entry (s, t) is equal to 1 if t = φ(s), and is
0 otherwise. Note that U1(I, y) =
∑
s∈S u
1(s, y(· | s)), and U1(µφ, y) = ∑s∈S u1(s, y(· | φ(s))).
Assume first that Q2 holds, and let µ ∈ M(m). By Lemma 14, µ can be written µ =
µ0 − I +
∑
φ αφP
φ, where the αφ are non negative reals and sum to one. Because U
1 is linear
in µ,
U1(µ, y) = U1(µ0, y)− U1(I, y) +
∑
φ
αφU
1(µφ, y).
By Q2, U1(I, y) ≥ U1(µφ, y) for every permutation φ, and therefore U1(I, y) ≥∑φ αφU1(µφ, y).
It follows that U1(µ0, y) ≥ U1(µ, y). Because this inequality holds for every µ ∈ M(µ), C1
holds.
Assume now that C1 holds. Fix a permutation φ, and define µε = µ0 − εI + εµφ, where
ε > 0. Because m has full support, one has µε ∈ M(m) provided ε is sufficiently small. Now,
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by C1, for each such ε,
U1(µ0, y) ≥ U1(µε, y) = U1(µ0, y)− εU1(I, y) + εU1(µφ, y).
It follows that U1(µφ, y) ≤ εU1(I, y). As this inequality holds for every permutation φ, Q2
holds.
B Proof of Lemma 10
Fix ε > 0, a stationary strategy y ∈ Yε(M), and a copula µ ∈ M. Since y ∈ Yε(M), one has
y = εy0 + (1 − ε)y1 for some y1 ∈ Y (M). Present µ as a convex combination of the extreme
points (µe)e of M: µ =
∑
µe∈Me
αeµe, with αe ≥ 0 and
∑
µe∈Me
αe = 1. Recall that µ0 is one of the
extreme points of M.
On the one hand, since U1 is bi-linear, one has
U1(µ0, y)− U1(µ, y) = εU1(µ0, y0) + (1− ε)U1(µ0, y1)− εU1(µ, y0)− (1− ε)U1(µ, y1)
≥ ε (U1(µ0, y0)− U1(µ, y0)) (10)
= ε
(
(1− α0)U1(µ0, y0)−
∑
µe 6=µ0
αeU
1(µe, y0)
)
(11)
≥ ε(1− α0)c1, (12)
where the inequality (10) holds because y1 ∈ Y (M) and by C1.
On the other hand, one has µ− µ0 =
∑
µe∈Me αe(µe − µ0), hence
‖µ− µ0‖1 ≤ c2
∑
µe∈Me,µe 6=µ0
αe = c2(1− α0). (13)
The result follows from (12) and (13).
C Proof of Lemma 13
Let µ ∈M′ be given, and define µ¯ ∈ ∆(T × S × T ) by
µ¯(t′, s, t) = µ(s, t)p(t | t′)m(t
′)
m(t)
, (t′s, t) ∈ T × S × T. (14)
For every two indices i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} with i < j, denote by µ¯i,j the marginal of µ¯ on the i-th
and j-th coordinates.
We will use the following properties of µ¯.
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Lemma 15 One has
1. µ¯2,3 = µ;
2. µ¯1,3(t
′, t) = m(t′)p(t | t′) for every t, t′ ∈ T ;
3. µ¯1,2(t
′, s′) =
∑
s∈S µ¯2,3(s, t
′)p(s′ | s), for each t′ ∈ T, s′ ∈ S;
4. µ¯(s | t′, t) = µ(s | t) for each (t′, s, t) ∈ T × S × T .
Proof. We prove the four claims in turn. Let s, t ∈ S × T be given. One has
µ¯2,3(s, t) =
∑
t′∈T
µ¯(t′, s, t) =
∑
t′∈T
µ(s, t)p(t | t′)m(t
′)
m(t)
=
µ(s, t)
m(t)
∑
t′∈T
p(t | t′)m(t′) = µ(s, t),
which proves the first claim.
To prove the second claim, let t′, t ∈ T be given. One has
µ¯1,3(t
′, t) =
∑
s∈S
µ¯(t′, s, t) =
∑
s∈S
µ(s, t)p(t | t′)m(t
′)
m(t)
= p(t | t′)m(t′),
where the last equality holds since the marginal distribution of µ on S is m.
We turn to the third claim. Let t′ ∈ T , s′ ∈ S be given. By the first claim, and since
µ ∈M′, one has∑
s∈S
µ¯2,3(s, t
′)p(s′ | s) =
∑
s∈S
µ(s, t′)p(s′ | s) = m(t′)
∑
t∈T
µ(s′ | t)p(t | t′). (15)
On the other hand,
µ¯1,2(t
′, s′) =
∑
t∈T
µ¯(t′, s′, t) =
∑
t∈T
µ(s′, t)p(t | t′)m(t
′)
m(t)
. (16)
The third claim follows from (15) and (16).
Finally, let (t′, s, t) ∈ T × S × T be given. By the second claim,
µ¯(s | t′, t) = µ¯(t
′, s, t)
µ1,3(t′, t)
=
µ(s, t)p(t | t′)
p(t | t′)m(t′) ×
m(t′)
m(t)
= µ(s | t),
and the fourth claim follows.
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We construct the sequence (tn)n as follows. The initial values t0 and t1 are drawn according
to the conditional distribution µ¯(·|s1) ∈ ∆(T × T ). For n 6= 2, tn is drawn according to the
conditional distribution µ¯(· | tn−1, sn). In this construction, t0 is used to unify the treatment of
s1 with that of (sn)n≥2. Property P4 thus holds by construction. Properties P1 and P2 follow
from the next lemma.
Lemma 16 The law of (tn−1, sn, tn) is equal to µ¯, for each stage n ≥ 1.
Proof. We argue by induction. Observe that the law of s1 is equal to m. Therefore,
P((t0, s1, t1) = (t
′, s, t)) = m(s)µ¯(t′, t | s) = µ¯(t′, s, t).
Assume that the claim holds for some n ∈ N. We will prove that the law of (tn, sn+1) is then
equal to µ¯1,2. This follows from the following sequence of equalities, which holds for every
t′ ∈ T, s ∈ S:
P((tn, sn+1) = (t
′, s)) =
∑
s′∈S
P((sn, tn, sn+1) = (s
′, t′, s))
=
∑
s′∈S
P((sn, tn) = (s
′, t′))×P(sn+1 = s|(sn, tn) = (s′, t))
=
∑
s′∈S
µ¯2,3(s
′, t′)p(s | s′) = µ¯1,2(t′, s),
where the last equality follows from Lemma 15(3) and P4. Since the conditional law of tn+1
given (tn, sn+1) is equal to µ¯(· | tn, sn+1), this yields the claim for n+ 1.
Finally, property P3 follows from the second part of the next lemma. The first part of the
lemma is needed to the proof of the second part.
Lemma 17 (1) The conditional law of tn given (t0, . . . , tn−1) coincides with the conditional
law of tn given tn−1.
(2) The conditional law of sn given (t0, . . . , tn−1, tn) coincides with the conditional law of sn
given tn.
Proof. The proof is by induction. For n = 1, the first statement trivially holds, while the
second statement holds by Lemma 15(1). Assume that the claim holds for some n ∈ N. For
brevity, we denote by tn, sn, · · · generic values of tn, sn · · · , and we write P(tn, sn) instead of
P((tn, sn) = (tn, sn)).
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Observe first that by the definition of (tn),
P(tn+1 | t0, . . . , tn) =
∑
sn+1∈S
P(sn+1 | t0, . . . , tn)P(tn+1 | t0, . . . , tn, sn+1)
=
∑
sn+1∈S
P(sn+1 | t0, . . . , tn)× µ¯(tn+1 | tn, sn+1). (17)
Moreover,
P(sn+1 | t0, . . . , tn) =
∑
sn∈S
P(sn | t0, . . . , tn)P(sn+1 | sn, t0, . . . , tn)
=
∑
sn∈S
P(sn | t0, . . . , tn)× p(sn+1 | sn)
=
∑
sn∈S
P(sn | tn)× p(sn+1 | sn), (18)
where the last equality holds by the induction hypothesis. Note that the right-hand side of (18)
is independent of (t0, t1, . . . , tn−1), and therefore
P(sn+1 | t0, . . . , tn) = P(sn+1 | tn). (19)
Plugging (18) in (17), one obtains
P(tn+1 | t0, . . . , tn) =
∑
sn+1∈S
∑
sn∈S
P(sn | tn)× p(sn+1 | sn)× µ¯(tn+1 | tn, sn+1).
The right hand side is independent of t1, . . . , tn−1, hence it is equal to P(tn+1 | tn), and the first
part of the lemma follows.
We turn to the second statement. One has
P(sn+1 | t0, . . . , tn+1) = P(sn+1, tn+1 | t0, . . . , tn)
P(tn+1 | t0, . . . , tn) =
P(sn+1 | t0, . . . , tn)×P(tn+1 | sn+1, t0, . . . , tn)
P(tn+1 | t0, . . . , tn)
=
P(sn+1 | tn)µ¯(tn+1 | sn+1, tn)
P(tn+1 | tn = P(sn+1 | tn)
µ(sn+1, tn+1)
µ¯(tn, sn+1)
m(tn)
m(tn+1)
=
µ(sn+1, tn+1)
m(tn+1)
= P(sn+1 | tn+1),
where the third equality holds by (19), the construction of (tn)n and the first claim, and the
fourth equality holds by (14). This concludes the proof of the induction step.
The proof of Lemma 13 is now completed.
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D Proof of Lemma 12
We here verify that if Assumption A holds thenM =M′. Let p be a transition function such
that p(s′ | s) = αs′ for every two states s 6= s′, and p(s | s) = 1−
∑
s′ 6=s
αs′ . Set C =
∑
s∈S
αs. One
can verify that the invariant measure of p is given by m(s) = αs
C
for each s ∈ S.
Let µ ∈M. We will prove that for every (t, s′) ∈ T × S, the equality∑
s∈S
µ(s | t)p(s′ | s) =
∑
t′∈T
µ(s′ | t′)p(t′ | t) (20)
holds. Fix t ∈ T and s′ ∈ S. Observe that
∑
s∈S
µ(s | t)p(s′ | s) = µ(s′ | t)
(
1−
∑
s 6=s′
αs
)
+
∑
s 6=s′
αs′µ(s | t)
= µ(s′ | t)
(
1−
∑
s 6=s′
αs
)
+ αs′(1− µ(s′ | t))
= αs′ + µ(s
′ | t)(1− C). (21)
On the other hand, one has
∑
t′∈T
µ(s′ | t′)p(t′ | t) = µ(s′ | t)
(
1−
∑
t′ 6=t
αt′
)
+
∑
t′ 6=t
µ(s′ | t′)αt′ (22)
= µ(s′ | t) (1− C + αt) +
∑
t′ 6=t
µ(s′ | t′)αt′ . (23)
When subtracting (22) from (21) one obtains∑
s∈S
µ(s | t)p(s′ | s)−
∑
t′∈T
µ(s′ | t′)p(t′ | t) = αs′ − µ(s′ | t)αt −
∑
t′ 6=t
µ(s′ | t′)αt′
= αs′ −
∑
t′∈S
µ(s′ | t′)αt′
= αs′ − C
∑
t′∈S
µ(s′ | t′)m(t′) (24)
= αs′ − Cm(s′) = 0,
where (24) and (25) hold since α(s) = Cm(s) for every s ∈ S. This proves (20), as desired.
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E Proof of Theorem 5
The proof of Theorem 5 consists of two independent parts. We first prove that, if condition B
does not hold for some game G, then it does not hold throughout some neighborhood of G.
Proposition 18 Let G be a game that does not satisfy condition B. Then there is a neighbor-
hood N of G such that no game in N satisfies condition B.
Proof. The proof relies on the theory of semi-algebraic sets. We refer to Bochnak, Coste
and Roy (1998) for the results used below. Recall that the set of extreme points of the polytope
M is denoted by Me.
We will use the following two properties, that hold for constant functions y : S → ∆(B).
R1. If y : S → ∆(B) is constant, then U1(µ0, y) = U1(µ, y) for every µ ∈M.
R2. If y : S → ∆(B) is constant, then U2(µ0, y) ≤ v2.
Property R1 holds because when y is independent of S, the payoff is independent of the sender’s
announcements. Property R2 holds because v2 is the maximum of U2(µ0, y) over all constant
functions y.
Given a payoff function u˜ : S ×B → R2, we denote by S(u˜) the system of inequalities
U˜2(µ0, y) ≥ v2u˜ and U˜1(µ0, y) ≥ U˜1(µ, y), for all µ ∈Me,
with unknowns y : S → ∆(B), where v2u˜ = maxb∈B U˜2(µ0, b) is the min-max value of the receiver
in the game with payoffs u˜.
We say that a vector y ∈ RS×B is constant if y(s, b) only depends on b.
Let u denote the payoff function of G. By assumption, any solution y to S(u) is constant.
We will show that this implies that all solutions to S(u˜) are constant, for all u˜ in a neighborhood
of u.
Assume to the contrary that for every ε > 0 there is a payoff function uε ∈ R2(S×B) such
that (i) ‖u− uε‖ < ε, and (ii) the system S(uε) has a non-constant solution yε ∈ RS×B.
This implies that there is a semi-algebraic map ε ∈ (0, 1) 7→ (uε, yε) such that (i) limε→0 uε =
u, and (ii) yε is a non-constant solution to S(uε) for every ε > 0 small enough.
In particular, the map ε 7→ yε has an expansion to a Puiseux series in a neighborhood of
zero: there exist ε0 > 0, a natural number r and vectors yk ∈ RS×B for k ≥ 0 such that
yε =
∞∑
k=0
ε
k
r yk,
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for every ε ∈ (0, ε0), and a similar expansion exists for the map ε 7→ uε.
Note that y0 = limε→0 yε. This implies in particular that y0(·, s) ∈ ∆(B) for every s ∈ S,
and that y0 is a solution to S(u). In particular, y0 is constant.
Because yε(·, s) ∈ ∆(B), it follows that
∑
b∈B yε(b | s) = 1 for every ε > 0 and every s ∈ S,
so that
∑
b∈B yk(b | s) = 0 for every k ≥ 1 and every s ∈ S.
Let l ≥ 0 be the maximal integer such that y0, y1, . . . , yl are constant functions. Because yε
is non constant for every ε > 0, we have l <∞. Define a vector d ∈ RB by
d(b) = min
s∈S
yl+1(b, s), ∀b ∈ B.
Note that
yε =
∞∑
k=0
ε
k
r yk (25)
=
(
l∑
k=0
ε
k
r yk + ε
l+1
r d
)
+ ε
l+1
r (yl+1 − d) +
∞∑
k=l+2
ε
k
r yk. (26)
The first term
(∑l
k=0 ε
k
r yk + ε
l+1
r d
)
is independent of s, and all its coordinates are non-negative
because yε is non-negative for every ε > 0. Set
zε =
∑l
k=0 ε
k
r yk + ε
l+1
r d
1 + ε
l+1
r
∑
b∈B d(b)
∈ RS×B.
Then zε(·, s) ∈ ∆(B) for every s ∈ S, and zε is independent of s. Set
w(·, s) = yl+1(·, s)− d−∑b∈B d(b) ∈ RS×B, ∀s ∈ S.
Then w(s) ∈ ∆(B) and w is non-constant. We will show that w solves S(u), contradicting the
assumption that all solutions of S(u) are constant.
By R2, for every ε > 0 we have U˜2(µ0, zε) ≤ v2uε . But U˜2(µ0, yε) ≥ v2uε , and yε is a convex
combination of zε, w, and a “tail” which is of a lower order of ε; by taking the limit ε→ 0 and
using v2uε → v2 we obtain U2(µ0, w) ≥ v2.
Fix µ ∈ Me. By R1 it follows that U˜1(µ0, zε) = U˜1(µ, zε). Because U˜1(µ0, yε) ≥ U˜1(µ, yε),
it follows for the same reasoning as above that U1(µ0, w) ≥ U1(µ,w).
We turn to the second part of the proof.
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Proposition 19 Let G be a game such that condition B holds. Then any neighborhood of the
game G contains a game G′ such that ÊG′(M) 6= ∅.
Proof. The proof combines three independent lemmas. We first show that there are
perturbations of u2 such that the inequality in (i) holds strictly for the perturbed game. Next,
we show that the map y may be assumed to be one-to-one. Finally, we construct perturbations
of u1 such that the inequalities in (ii) will be strict.
Lemma 20 Let G be a game with payoff function u, and let y : S → ∆(B) be a non-constant
function such that U2(µ0, y) ≥ v2. Then, any neighborhood of u2 contains payoff functions u˜2
such that U˜2(µ0, y) > v˜
2.
Proof. Define P ∈ ∆(S × B) by P (s, b) := m(s)y(b | s), for s ∈ S, b ∈ B, and let ε > 0 be
given. We abuse notations and still denote by P the two marginals of P over S and B. Note
that P (s) = m(s) > 0 for each s ∈ S. Define u˜2 : S ×B → R by u˜2(s, b) = u2(s, b) if P (b) = 0,
and
u˜2(s, b) = u2(s, b) + ε
P (s, b)
P (s)P (b)
if P (b) > 0.
We claim that U˜2(µ0, y) > v˜
2. Since ε is arbitrary, the result will follow. Note first that, for
b ∈ B such that P (b) > 0, one has
U˜2(µ0, b) = U
2(µ0, b) + ε
∑
s∈S
m(s)
P (s, b)
m(s)P (b)
= U2(b, µ0) + ε.
Hence, v˜2 = v2 + ε (see Eq. (1)). On the other hand, since y(b | s) = P (s,b)
m(s)
= P (s,b)
P (s)
= P (b | s),
U˜2(µ0, y) = U
2(µ0, y) + ε
∑
s∈S,b∈B
m(s)y(b | s) P (s, b)
P (s)P (b)
= U2(µ0, y) + ε
∑
s∈S
m(s)
∑
b∈B
P (b | s)2
P (b)
.
Viewed as a function of the probability distribution q ∈ ∆(B), the expression
∑
b∈B
(q(b))2
P (b)
is
strictly convex, and admits a unique minimum equal to 1, when q = P . Thus, for fixed state
s ∈ S, one has ∑b∈B P (b|s)2P (b) ≥ 1, with a strict inequality whenever the conditional distribution
P (· | s) differs from P . Since y is non-constant, there exist one state s such that P (· | s) 6= P .
Therefore,
U˜2(µ0, y) > U
2(µ0, y) + ε ≥ v2 + ε = v˜2,
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as desired.
Lemma 21 Let G be a game with payoff function u, and let y : S → ∆(B) be such that
U1(µ0, y) ≥ U1(µ, y) for each µ ∈ M. Then, any neighborhood of y in RS×B contains a
one-to-one function y˜ : S → ∆(B) such that U1(µ0, y˜) ≥ U1(µ, y˜) for each µ ∈M.
Proof. It suffices to show the existence of a one-to-one map z˜ : S → ∆(B) such that
U1(µ0, z˜) ≥ U1(µ, z˜) for each µ ∈ M. Indeed, the conclusion of the lemma then follows by
setting y˜ = (1− ε)y + εz˜, for ε > 0 small enough.
Let (zs)s∈S be arbitrary distinct elements of ∆(B). Let φ˜ be a permutation over S that
maximizes the sum
∑
s∈S
u1(s, zψ(s)) over all permutations ψ, and set z˜s = zφ˜(s). By construction,
one has ∑
s∈S
u1(s, z˜s) ≥
∑
s∈S
u1(s, z˜φ(s)),
for every permutation φ over S. By Lemma 3, this implies U1(µ0, z˜) ≥ U1(µ, z˜) for every
µ ∈M, as desired.
Lemma 22 Let G be a game with payoff function u, and let y : S → ∆(B) be a one-to-one
map such that U1(µ0, y) ≥ U1(µ, y) for each µ ∈ M. Then, any neighborhood of u1 contains
payoff functions u˜1 such that U˜1(µ0, y) > U˜
1(µ, y) for each µ ∈M, µ 6= µ0.
Note that the existence of a stationary strategy y that satisfies the requirements follows from
Lemma 21.
Proof. Let G, u and y be as stated. Given ε > 0, we define u˜1 : S ×B → R by
u˜1(s, b) = u1(s, b) + εy(b | s).
We will prove that for every ε > 0, one has U˜1(µ0, y) > U˜
1(µ, y) for each µ ∈M \ {µ0}.
Given a permutation φ over S, we denote by Yφ ∈ RS×B the vector whose (s, b)-component
is equal to y(b | φ(s)). Then,∑
s∈S
u˜1(s, y(· | φ(s)) =
∑
s∈S,b∈B
y(b | φ(s))u˜(s, b) (27)
=
∑
s∈S,b∈B
y(b | φ(s))u(s, b) + ε
∑
s∈S,b∈B
y(b | φ(s))y(b | s) (28)
=
∑
s∈S
u1(s, y(· | φ(s)) + ε〈YId, Yφ〉, (29)
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where 〈YId, Yφ〉 =
∑
s∈S,b∈B y(b | φ(s))y(b | s) is the standard scalar product in RS×B.
Since y is one-to-one, the vectors Yφ and YId are not co-linear as soon as φ 6= Id. By
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, it follows that
〈YId, Yφ〉 < ‖YId‖2‖Yφ‖2 = ‖YId‖2 = 〈YId, YId〉 (30)
where the first equality holds since the components of Yφ are obtained by permuting the com-
ponents of YId.
On the other hand, observe that by Lemma 3, one has∑
s∈S
u1(s, y(· | φ(s)) ≤
∑
s∈S
u1(s, y(· | s). (31)
Plugging (31) into (27), one obtains∑
s∈S
u˜1(s, y(· | φ(s)) <
∑
s∈S
u1(s, y(· | s) + 〈YId, YId〉 =
∑
s∈S
u˜1(s, y(· | s).
By Lemma 3 this yields U˜1(µ0, y) > U˜
1(µ, y), for every µ 6= µ0 in M, as desired.
The proof of Proposition 19 follows from Lemmas 20, 21 and 22.
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